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1.  Introduction 
Most  major  primary  commodities  are  actively  traded  on  futures  markets  and  the  prices 
discovered  on  these  markets  forms  the  basis  for  transactions  prices  in  international 
commerce.  Transactors  in  futures  markets  are  generally  classified  as  either  hedgers  or 
speculators and the exchanges are seen as transferring price exposure from the hedgers to 
speculators in exchange for a risk premium. Speculators take a view, either on the basis of 
information or through the use of more or less sophisticated trend-spotting procedures, on the 
prospects  of  the  particular  commodities  in  which  they  take  positions.  They  provide  the 
liquidity which allows hedgers to find counterparties. However, over the past two decades, a 
third class of transactors has become important. These are investors who regard commodity 
futures as an  asset class, comparable to equities, bonds, real estate and emerging market 
assets and who take positions on commodities as a group based on the risk-return properties 
of  portfolios  containing  commodity  futures  relative  to  those  confined  to  traditional  asset 
classes. As Masters (2008) testified, their behaviour is very different from that of traditional 
speculators, and it is therefore possible that this will result in different effects on market 
prices.  
  The sums of money invested by this third group of commodity investors may be very 
substantial. According to many commentators, this class of inventors has come to dominate 
the commodity futures markets with the consequence that fundamental movements have been 
relegated  to  a  minor,  supporting,  role.  Commodity  markets  have  become  akin  to  foreign 
exchange  markets  where  weight  of  money  outweighs  the  relative  competitiveness 
(Purchasing Power Parity) fundamental. In June 2008 testimony to the U.S. Congress, George 
Soros asserted that investment in instruments linked to commodity indices had become the 
“elephant in the room” and argued that investment in commodity futures might exaggerate 
price rises (Soros, 2008). These comments were echoed by the British peer Meghnad Desai 
who further claimed that 2008 oil price rises were speculative and appeared to be a financial 
bubble.
1 One might paraphrase this view as stating that, in effect, the funds have become the 
fundamentals.  
  Over the past two decades, investment in commodities through managed commodity 
futures funds or using other vehicles has become a large, popular and profitable activity. The 
principles of, and problems with, commodity investment are well understood in the financial 
community, and have been set out in a number of recent practitioner-oriented publications – 
                                                 
1 “Act now to price the bubble of a high oil price”, Financial Times, 6 June 2006.   2 
see Gregoriou et al. (2004), Till and Eagleeye (2007) and Fabozzi et al. (2008a). There have 
been  fewer  discussions  of  commodity  investing  which  succeed  in  bridging  the  industry-
finance gap – see Geman (2005, especially chapter 14) and Radetzki (2007, 2008, ch.5). 
Perhaps as a result, commodity investors continue to be regarded with suspicion by other 
market participants and by outside commentators who see their activities as distorting the 
operation of the markets. Some politicians have followed Lord Desai in suggesting that these 
actors may be at least partially responsible, directly or indirectly, for recent high commodity 
price levels and have called for restrictions or limitations on futures trading. In this paper, I 
discuss of the mechanics of commodity speculation and investment and consider its effects 
on the cooperation of the underlying physical markets. 
In section 2, I distinguish between the various actors in commodity futures trading 
and  ask  whether  the  widely-used  Commitments  of  Traders  data,  made  available  by  the 
Commodity  Futures  Trading  Commission  (the  CFTC),  is  informative  in  relation  to  these 
distinctions. In section 3, I discuss actors normally thought of as speculators (Commodity 
Pool Operators, hedge funds and other traditional speculators) while section 4 looks at index-
based investment. Section 5 looks at the returns on index-based investment and suggests that 
these returns may be lower in the future than has been the case over recent years. In section 6 
I summarize the evidence on the effects of speculation on futures prices and volatility, and in 
section 7, I present evidence on the effects of index-based investments on prices. Section 8 
contains conclusions. 
 
2.  Instruments and actors 
Futures exchanges facilitate both commodity speculation and commodity investment. They 
do this in three ways: 
a)  Futures enable separation of ownership of the physical commodity from assumption 
of the price exposure.  It is possible to speculate or invest by buying the physical 
commodity but this will usually be very costly. When a speculator or investor takes a 
long futures position, ownership of the physical commodity remains with a merchant 
or  producer  who  has  a  corresponding  short  position  in  the  future.  Use  of  futures 
avoids the trouble and costs of managing the physical position. 
b)  Because one can only sell a physical commodity if one already owns it, it is difficult 
to  take  a  short  position  in  a  purely  physical  market.  Futures  makes  this 
straightforward – the costs of being long and short are identical.   3 
c)  Purchase of a physical commodity requires full cash payment at the time of purchase. 
It is possible for the speculator or investor to lever his position by taking a bank loan 
using the commodity as collateral but it is likely that the bank, conscious of the price 
risk, will only offer a fraction of the value. The purchaser of a futures contract will not 
be required to make any initial payment (a futures contract has zero value at the time 
of contracting) but will be required to make a deposit of initial margin, typically 10% 
of the value of position for a client of good standing – see Edwards and Ma (1992) 
and Hull (2006). Futures therefore allow much higher leverage than physicals. 
Futures contracts can only be traded on the exchange which originates them – contrast this 
with equities which can be traded on multiple platforms. Much speculation and investment 
takes place off exchanges through OTC (“over the counter”) rather than exchange contracts, 
in particular in the form of commodity swaps. An OTC contract can either be an exchange 
“look  alike”,  in  which  case  it  differs  from  an  exchange  future  only  in  that  it  is  not 
intermediated  through  the  exchange  clearing  house,  or  may  have  a  different  contract 
specification (e.g. delivery date or location).  
Exchange-traded funds (ETFs) and commodity index certificates (the OTC analogue 
of ETFs) are two specific instruments which facilitate commodity investment. Commodity 
ETFs are funds which invest in commodity futures but whose price is directly quoted on an 
exchange. They may either restrict themselves to specific commodities – ETFs are currently 
available for crude oil, gold and silver – or aim to replicate the returns on a commodity 
futures index. They have the same structure as closed end funds in equities. Certificates are 
legal obligations, typically issues by banks, which yield a return defined by an underlying set 
of commodity futures investments. They have a structure closer to that of open end funds in 
equities.  See  Engelke  and  Yuan  (2008)  and  Fabozzi  et  al.  (2008b,  p.13)  for  further 
discussion. 
Swaps are portfolios of OTC futures. In a commodity swap, the long party receives 
payments in proportion to the gains on a portfolio of futures contracts and pays either a fixed 
or floating interest rate. OTC contracts have the advantage that they can be designed to suit 
client requirements, but the disadvantage that they can only be closed out through the original 
counterparty, i.e. swaps are non-fungible. Importantly, commodity swaps imply counterparty 
risk  as  well  as  commodity  price  risk.  In  a  swap,  the  counterparty  (usually  a  bank)  will 
typically offset the net position in its swap book on exchange markets, and the swap will be 
marked to market against the exchange forward curve. Many institutional investors find it 
convenient to take on commodity exposure through a swap structure leaving the counterparty   4 
to  manage  the  offsetting  futures  investments.  Commodity  swaps  are  currently  the  most 
important instrument by which investors take positions on commodity futures indices (ITF, 
2008, p.22). 
Edwards and Ma (1992, p.11) state “Futures contracts are bought and sold by a large 
number of individuals and businesses, and for  a variety of purposes”.  This remains true. 
Broadly, we may delineate four classes of actors: 
a)  Hedgers: These are “commercials” in CFTC terminology. They have an exposure to 
the price of the physical commodity (long in the case of producers and merchants with 
inventory, short in the case of consumers) which they offset (usually partially) by 
taking an opposite position in the futures market. 
b)  Speculators: They take positions, generally short term based on views about likely 
price movements. Speculators may be divided between those who trade on market 
fundamentals and those who trade on a technical basis, i.e. on the basis of past trends 
or  other,  more  complicated,  price  patterns.  Hedge  funds  and  CTAs  (see  below) 
typically  fall  into  this  category.  Many  speculative  trades  are  “spread”  rather  than 
“outright” trades, that is to say they involve taking offsetting positions on related 
contracts (generally different maturities for the same future). 
c)  Investors: Investors take positions (usually long and usually indirectly) in commodity 
futures as a component of a diversified portfolio. This is the class of actors which 
appears to have grown dramatically over the two most recent decades. 
d)  Locals: Originally pit traders with modest capital but now mainly screen traders often 
operating  from  trading  “arcades”,  locals  provide  liquidity  by  “scalping”  high 
frequency price movements driven by fluctuations in trading volume and size. Many 
of their positions will also be spreads rather than outrights. Locals may also arbitrage 
across markets or exchanges.  
e)  Index  providers:  Banks  or  other  financial  institutions  who  facilitate  commodity 
investment by providing suitable instruments, typically ETFs, commodity certificates 
or swaps. These institutions will generally offset much of their net position by taking 
offsetting positions on the futures markets. 
These categories are easier to separate in principle than in practice. A producer or consumer 
who chooses not to hedge, or who hedges on a “discretionary” basis, is implicitly taking a 
speculative position. Some locals may hold significant outright positions over time. Long 
term investors will take speculative views on commodities versus other asset classes, and on 
specific groups of commodities (metals, energy etc.). Some agents have mixed motives.   5 
As already noted, many positions will be held through intermediaries: 
·  US legislation defines a commodity pool as an investment vehicle which takes long or 
short futures positions. A Commodity Pool Operator (CPO) operates a commodity 
pool. Commodity Trading Advisors (CTAs) advise on and manage futures accounts in 
CPOs  on  behalf  of  investors.  A  CPO  investment  is  a  straightforward  means  of 
investing in a portfolio of commodity futures. 
·  Hedge funds invest on behalf of rich individuals. Some of these investments are likely 
to be in commodity futures or swaps. “Funds of funds” are hedge funds, or CPOs 
which invest in other hedge funds or CPOs, generating greater diversification albeit at 
the  cost  of  a  second  level  of  fees.  A  small  number  of  hedge  funds  are  focussed 
specifically on traditional commodities, generally with an emphasis on energy and 
non-ferrous metals. 
·  Exchanges offer ETFs defined either in terms of specific commodities or commodity 
indices. Banks offer certificates with returns tied to or related to the same indices. 
The CFTC requires brokers to report all positions held by traders with positions exceeding a 
specified size, and also to report the aggregate of all smaller (“non-reporting”) positions. 
These  positions  are  published  in  anonymous  and  summary  form  in  the  weekly  CFTC 
Commitments  of  Traders  (COT)  report.  The  CFTC  classifies  reporting  traders  as  either 
“commercial”  or  “non-commercial”  depending  whether  or  not  they  have  a  commercial 
interest  in  the  underlying  physical  commodity.  Commentators,  both  academic  and  in  the 
industry, routinely interpret commercial positions as hedges, non-commercial positions as 
large speculative positions and non-reporting positions as small speculative positions – see 
Edwards and Ma (1992, pp.15-17). Upperman (2006) provides a guide to trading on the basis 
of the COT reports. 
It is widely perceived that, as the consequence of the increased diversity of futures 
actors  and  the  increased  complexity  of  their  activities,  the  COT  data  may  fail  to  fully 
represent futures market activity. Many institutions reporting positions as hedges, and which 
are  therefore  classified  as  commercial,  are  held  by  commodity  swap  dealers  to  offset 
positions  which,  if  held  directly  as  commodity  futures,  would  have  counted  as  non-
commercial. As the CFTC itself noted “… trading practices have evolved to such an extent 
that, today, a significant proportion of long-side open interest in a number of major physical 
commodity futures contracts is held by so-called non-traditional hedgers (e.g. swap dealers)   6 
… This has raised questions as to whether COT report can reliably be used to assess overall 
futures activity …” (CFTC, 2006, p.2).  
Responding  to  these  concerns,  the  CFTC  now  issues  a  supplementary  report  for 
twelve agricultural futures markets which distinguish positions held by institutions identified 
as index providers. However, they have chosen not to provide this additional information for 
energy and metals futures, at least for the present, on the grounds that offsetting may involve 
taking positions on non-US exchanges and because many swap dealers in metals and energy 
futures have physical activities on their own account making it difficult to separated hedging 
from speculative activities. See CFTC (2006). I make use of the data from the supplementary 
reports in the analysis that follows. 
 
3.  CPOs, hedge funds and other traditional speculators 
Commodity speculation has traditionally been thought of as undertaken by individuals – the 
proverbial New York cab drivers and Belgian dentists. Their activities are likely to be small 
in relation to the entire market and are reflected in the non-reporting columns of the COT 
reports.
2 There is no suggestion that this category of speculation has grown markedly over 
recent decades. Instead, commodity speculation has tended to be channelled through “funds”, 
in particular CPOs and hedge funds. The growth in fund activity may reflect the increasing 
number of highly wealthy individuals and the difficulty in obtaining high returns in what has 
been, until recently, a low inflation environment.  
 
Table 1 
2002 Funds Snapshot 






CPOs  1510  13  162  2% + 9% 
Hedge Funds  2357  36  1580  1% + 20% 
Funds of Funds  597  34  343  1% + 20% 
CPOs  are  funds  operated  by  CTAs.  Total  assets  may  double  count  money 
invested through funds of funds. Fee structure is fixed + percentage of profits. 
Source: Liang (2004). 
 
Table 1, taken from Liang (2004), gives a snapshot of money under management in 
CPOs, hedge funds and funds of funds in 2002. These figures almost certainly exaggerate the 
                                                 
2 i.e. Brokers report the aggregate of these positions to the CFTC, not the positions themselves.   7 
amount  of  money  estimated  in  “traditional  commodities”.  There  are  two  reasons  for  the 
overstatement in the aggregate fund figures: 
·  Most hedge funds invest across the entire range of asset classes. Instruments relating to 
traditional commodity markets are likely to account for only a small proportion of these 
investments. 
·  US CPOs and CTAs are regulated under the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA) which 
defines a commodity future as any futures contract traded on a futures exchange.
3 The 
commodity futures asset class therefore also includes financial futures as well as futures 
on traditional commodities. These are much more important in aggregate than futures on 
commodities. 
Within the commodity class, energy futures have traditionally had the highest weight and 
agricultural futures the lowest weight. Metals are intermediate. Fabozzi et al. (2008b) state 
that in 2007 there were around 450 hedge funds with energy and commodity-related trading 
strategies.  Schneeweis  et  al.  (2008)  offer  a  lower  estimate  of  around  $50bn  in  managed 
futures  investment  in  2002  rising  to  $160bn  by  the  third  quarter  of  2006.  Eling  (2008) 
suggests a 2007 figure of $135bn under CTA management. There is no reporting requirement 
on positions held on non-U.S. exchanges, and this prevents out obtaining a complete picture 
of participation in global futures markets. 
Irwin and Holt (2004), who use data deriving from a study undertaken by the CFTC 
on large positions on US futures exchanges over a six month period in 1994, provide the most 
comprehensive evidence on commodity allocations of CPOs and large hedge funds. Table 3, 
taken from Irwin and Holt (2004), gives percentage allocations on a gross and net volume 
(i.e.  offsetting  long  and  short  positions)  basis  and  confirms  the  heavy  concentration  on 
financial futures (including gold futures). Note, however, that positions in agricultural futures 
are comparable with those in energy. It is unfortunate that more recent data of this type are 
unavailable.
4 
The estimates in Table 2 suggest around 30% of commodity fund investments were in 
traditional commodities in 1994. Combining the estimates from Tables 1 and 2, and making 
the heroic assumptions that the same allocations apply to CTAs and hedge funds and that 
                                                 
3 The CFTC is responsible for regulation of what the CEA defines as commodity futures markets. It is 
unclear whether the CFTC or the Securities and Exchanges Commission (SEC) has responsibility for 
regulating futures on individual equities. The CEA is codified at 7 USC Section 1. 
4 Gupta and Wilkens (2007) have suggested quantification of CTA exposure through estimation of the 
betas of CTA returns. Their estimates are broadly in line with those reported in Table 2 but suggest 
lower weights for agriculturals.   8 
these proportions were unchanged from 1994 to 2002, we may estimate that commodities 
accounted for that approximately $50bn of the $162bn managed by CTAs in 2002. (It is 
difficult to make a comparable judgement for hedge funds since their assets are not entirely, 
and perhaps not mainly, invested in futures). 
 
Table 2 
Composition of Large CPO and Large Hedge Fund Futures Portfolios,  
April – October 1994 
Gross Volume  Net Volume  Gross Volume  Net Volume 
Coffee  1.6%  1.7%  Gold  25.7%  8.0% 
Copper  2.9%  3.0%  Live hogs  7.4%  0.9% 
Corn  5.4%  5.7%  Natural gas  0.9%  4.5% 
Cotton  2.3%  2.6%  S&P 500  5.5%  7.1% 
Crude oil  4.0%  8.4%  Soybeans  6.8%  6.1% 
Deutschemark  8.2%  7.3%  Treasury bonds  23.2%  21.8% 
Eurodollar  6.0%  22.9%       
Source: Irwin  and Holt (2004), Table 8.2 
 
Irwin and Holt also present the same numbers as a proportion of total trading volume 
on the relevant exchanges and I reproduce these numbers (again relating to 1994) as Table 3. 
At times when funds take large positions, these amounted to between one quarter and one 




Large CTA and Large Hedge Fund Futures Portfolios as a Share 
of Total Volume,  
April – October 1994 
  Gross Volume  Net Volume 
  Average  Maximum  Average  Maximum 
Coffee  6.9%  26.7%  5.9%  26.7% 
Copper  11.1%  39.8%  9.3%  34.6% 
Corn  7.0%  23.0%  6.0%  23.0% 
Cotton  12.9%  39.4%  11.1%  39.4% 
Crude oil  5.4%  19.5%  4.4%  16.3% 
Deutschemark  5.3%  23.1%  4.8%  20.1% 
Eurodollar  7.2%  28.5%  5.3%  23.6% 
Gold  8.6%  24.7%  7.3%  24.7% 
Live hogs  11.6%  47.8%  9.4%  47.8% 
Natural gas  14.0%  54.4%  12.2%  53.6% 
S&P 500  3.7%  14.9%  3.2%  12.0% 
Soybeans  6.7%  12.6%  6.0%  21.6% 
Treasury bonds  2.4%  10.3%  1.8%  7.5% 
Source: Irwin  and Holt (2004), Table 8.3   9 
 
CTAs are obliged, under the CEA, to disclose their investment strategies. The most 
important  distinction  among  CTAs  is  between  the  majority,  which  follow  “passive” 
allocation  strategies  and  the  much  smaller  minority  which  adopt  discretionary  strategies. 
Passive strategies rely on trend identification and extrapolation – once an upward trend is 
identified, the fund will take a long position in the asset and vice versa for a downward trend. 
Trends are generally identified by application of more or less sophisticated moving average 
procedures – see Taylor (2005, ch. 7). CTAs compete on the predictive power of their trend 
extraction procedures and also on the extent of their activity – whether they always take a 
position in a particular future or whether they can be out of the market for that future for 
extended periods.  
Hedge funds are both more diverse and less transparent than CTAs. They are not 
obliged  to  report  their  investment  strategies  which  must  therefore  be  inferred  from 
performance. They will also typically be opportunistic and hence may not follow consistent 
strategies  over  time.  I  do  not  attempt  to  quantify  their  activities  or  importance  in  this 
discussion. 
 
4.  Commodity index investors 
The  driving  rationale  of  investment  in  commodity  futures  is  that  commodities  may  be 
considered  as  a  distinct  “asset  class”,  and  seen  in  this  light,  have  favourable  risk-return 
characteristics. The claim that commodities form a distinct asset class, analogous with the 
equity,  fixed  interest  and  real  estate  asset  classes,  supposes  that  the  class  is  fairly 
homogeneous  so  that  it  may  be  spanned  by  a  small  number  of  representative  positions. 
Specifically, this requires that the class have a unique risk premium which is not replicable by 
combining other asset classes – see Scherer and He (2008). Given this premise, the claim that 
commodities form an asset class which is interesting to investors relies on their exhibiting a 
sufficiently high excess return and sufficiently low correlations with other asset classes such 
that, when added to portfolio, the overall risk-return characteristics of the portfolio improve – 
see Bodie and Rosansky (1980), Jaffee (1989), Gorton and Rouwenhorst (2006), and for a 
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Index funds set out to replicate a particular commodity futures index in the same way 
that  equity  tracking  funds  aim  to  replicate  the  returns  on  an  equities  index,  such  as  the 
S&P500 or the FTSE100. The most widely followed commodity futures indices are the S&P 
GSCI and the DJ-AIG index.  The S&P GSCI is weighted in relation to world production of 
the commodity averaged over the previous five years.
5 These are quantity weights and hence 
imply that the higher the price of the commodity future, the greater its share in the S&P 
GSCI. Recent high energy prices imply a very large energy weighting – 71% in September 
2008.  The  DJ-AIG  Index  weights  the  different  commodities  primarily  in  terms  of  the 
liquidity  of  the  futures  contracts  (i.e.  futures  volume  and  open  interest),  but  in  addition 
considers production. Averaging is again over five years. Importantly, the DJ-AIG Index also 
aims for diversification and limits the share of any one commodity group to one third of the 
total.    The  September  2008  energy  share  fell  just  short  of  this  limit.
6  September  2008 
weightings of these two indices are charted in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1: Commodity Composition, S&P GSCI (left) and DJ-AIG Commodity Indices, 
September 2008 
 
The sums of money invested by this third group of commodity investors may be very 
substantial. Using official non-public information, the CFTC estimated the notional value of 
positions held by index-funds to the $146bn at end December 2007as $146bn ($118bn on 
                                                 
5 http://www2.goldmansachs.com/gsci/#passive   
6 http://www.djindexes.com/mdsidx/index.cfm?event=showAigIntro  Raab (2007) argues that returns 
on energy futures tend to be more highly correlated with returns on financial assets, implying that an 




















20.8%  11 
U.S. exchanges) rising to $200bn at the end of June 2008 ($161bn on U.S. exchanges). See 
CFTC (2008). Table 4 summarizes these data for the eleven commodities covered in the 




Index Fund Values and Shares  
  31 Dec 2007  30 June 2008 
  $bn  Share  $bn  Share 
Crude oil  39.1  31.1%  51.0  26.6% 
Gasoline  4.5  22.9%  8.0  23.9% 
Heating oil  7.8  34.8%  10.0  34.5% 
Natural gas  10.8  16.8%  17.0  14.7% 
Copper  2.8  49.9%  4.4  41.7% 
Gold  7.3  15.9%  9.0  22.7% 
Silver  1.8  15.5%  2.3  20.1% 
Corn  7.6  25.8%  13.1  27.4% 
Soybeans  8.7  26.1%  10.9  20.8% 
Soybean oil  2.1  24.8%  2.6  21.7% 
Wheat  9.3  38.2%  9.7  41.9% 
Cocoa  0.4  11.3%  0.8  14.1% 
Coffee  2.2  26.0%  3.1  25.6% 
Cotton  2.6  33.0%  2.9  21.5% 
Sugar  3.2  29.0%  4.9  31.1% 
Feeder cattle  0.4  23.2%  0.6  30.7% 
Live cattle  4.5  48.4%  6.5  41.8% 
Lean hogs  2.1  43.6%  3.2  40.6% 
Other U.S. markets  0.7    1.4   
Total (U.S. markets)  117.9  26.8%  161.5  25.8% 
Non-U.S. markets  28.1    38.4   
Overall total  146.0    199.9   
Source: columns 1 and 3 CFTC (2008) valued at front position closing 
prices; columns 2 and 4, CFTC, Commitment of Traders reports. The 
wheat figures aggregate positions on the Chicago Board of Trade and 
the Kansas City Board of Trade. Open interest is valued at the closing 
price of the front contract. The aggregate share relates to positions on 
U.S. exchanges for the listed commodities. Except in the final two rows, 
figures relate only to positions held on U.S. exchanges. 
 
Of the $161bn of commodity index business in U.S. markets at the end of June 30 2008, 
approximately 24% percent was held by index funds, 42% by institutional investors, 9% by 
sovereign wealth funds and the remaining 25% by other traders (CFTC, 2008).  The table 
                                                 
7 Twelve contracts since wheat is traded on both the Chicago Board of Trade and the Kansas City 
Board of Trade.   12 
also gives the shares of the index funds’ net positions in total open interest. These average 
26%-27%, but are much higher for copper, crude oil, wheat, live cattle and lean hogs.  
 
5.  Commodity index investment returns 
Over the long term, the trend in physical commodity prices is determined by the trend in 
production costs. Two opposing factors are at work here: 
·  Productivity changes take place in the agriculture, mining and energy industries just 
as they do in manufacturing. The difference is that, while in manufacturing, much of 
these productivity advances show up as quality improvements (a 2008 automobile is 
quieter, more fuel efficient and safer than a 1978 automobile), in the commodities 
industries, productivity advance shows up entirely in lower prices (a barrel of oil in 
2008 is identical to a 1978 barrel) – see Lipsey (1994). Productivity advances thus 
tend to put measured prices onto a downward trend. 
·  Metals and energy are non-renewable. Companies will exploit the highest grade and 
most accessible deposits before lower grade and more remote deposits. As these low 
cost deposits become exhausted, average extraction costs rise (Hotelling, 1931). 
The first of these effects was dominant over the twentieth century and prices fell in real terms 
at around 2% per annum. A long buy-hold strategy for physical commodities would therefore 
not only have been expensive in terms of warehousing and financing costs but would also 
have yielded poor financial returns. This may change in the future if production does become 
constrained by lack of resources, as may already be the case with petroleum. 
The returns from investing in commodity futures are more complicated. The returns 
from a long portfolio of commodity futures have four components – see Lewis (2007) 
a)  the spot  or holding return, 
b)  the roll yield  
c)  the collateral yield, and 
d)  (depending on the definition of the portfolio) the recomposition yield. 
The spot return is the appreciation or depreciation of the different futures contracts held in the 
portfolio. The roll return arises from selling short dated positions and moving into longer 
dated positions in the same future. The collateral yield is the risk-free rate of return earned on 
the investor’s margin account. If the investment is unlevered, this will be the riskless return 
on the sum invested. Recomposition yield arises from periodic redefinition of the basket of 
commodities underlying the index. The total return is the sum of the four components. The   13 
final component, which may be important, is discretionary and hence is generally ignored. 
The excess return on a constant composition index is the sum of the first two components. 
Consider first the holding (spot) return on the rolled futures position. This will differ 
from the spot return on the physical commodity by exclusion of the expected element in the 
latter. In practice, commodity price movements are largely unexpected with the result that 
movements in commodity futures prices are highly correlated with spot price movements – 
see Gorton and Rouwenhorst (2006). A second way of making the same point is that, if 
futures  prices  were  unbiased,  this  return  element  would  have  expected  value  of  zero. 
However, if speculators (and investors) are net long and commodity risk is not completely 
diversifiable, long futures positions can earn a risk premium. The evidence is emphatic that, 
over the long term, spot returns have contributed little to overall returns on rolled commodity 
futures  positions  –  see  Beenen  (2005)  and  Erb  et  al.  (2008).  However,  they  were  very 
important over the commodity boom of the first decade of the current century. 
Roll returns will be positive when markets are in backwardation (i.e. when short dated 
positions are at a premium to longer dated positions) and negative in contango markets. The 
long  term  contribution  of  roll  returns  therefore  depends  on  the  extent  to  which  “normal 
backwardation” (Keynes, 1930) prevails. The evidence on this is mixed. On the one hand, 
Erb and Harvey (2006) have shown that roll returns account for over 90% of total excess 
returns on rolled futures on specific commodities over the period December 1982 to May 
2004 – see also Erb et al. (2008). On the other hand, there is little general evidence for 
normal backwardation – see Kolb (1992), who states “normal backwardation is not normal”, 
and also Scherer and He (2008). The reconciliation of these conflicting pieces of evidence 
may be that, either by accident, design or evolution, commodity futures indices have been 
weighted towards those commodities with the highest excess returns and hence the highest 
roll returns. Energy products have dominated this list.  
Rebalancing  yield  is  important  since  commodity  indices  rarely  retain  a  constant 
composition over time – see Erb and Harvey (2006). Portfolios which rebalance so as to 
capture backwardation tend to out-perform passive strategies – see Gorton and Rouwenhorst 
(2006).  Different  portfolios  might  rebalance  in  different  ways,  so  this  return  component  
appears to be discretionary rather than directly implied by the asset returns. As already noted, 
it is generally ignored in calculating index returns.
8 
                                                 
8  Backwardation  is  associated  with  shortage  and  hence  high  prices,  and  so  rebalancing  towards 
constant value shares will tend to generate a positive return over time provided prices mean revert. 



























Figure 2: S&P GSCI Excess Return Index, January 1970 – December 2007 
 
Figure 2 charts the S&P GSCI from its notional inception in 1970 to the end of 2007. A long 
investment in a GSCI fund would have shown handsome positive returns over the periods of 
rising oil prices in the  early  and late nineteen  seventies (1971-74 average 36%, 1978-79 
average 21%) and from 1999 until late 2005 (average 18%). The index was flat or declining 
during the recession of the first half of the nineteen eighties (1980-86 average -6%) but then 
recovered  sharply  in  the  latter  half  of  the  eighties  (1987-90  average  21%).  The  nineteen 
nineties were a second period of largely flat or negative returns (1991-98 average -5%). The 
index was down 19% in 2006 but has recovered part of this loss in 2007. Over the entire 
period  of  27  years,  excess  returns  averaged  8.1%  with  a  standard  deviation  of  23.0%, 
implying a Sharpe ratio of 0.35. Recomposition has not been important for the S&P GSCI so 
little is lost by supposing constant composition. 
Commodity investments are generally justified more in terms of their contribution to 
overall portfolio returns than as attractive stand alone investments. Gorton and Rouwenhorst 
(2005)  analyze  data  from  July  1957  to  December  2004,  which  is  a  longer  period  than 
                                                                                                                                                        
between the (weighted) geometric and arithmetic returns on the portfolio assets – a constant value 
portfolio will return the latter while a portfolio which is constant in terms of the number of contracts 
will return the latter. See also Erb at al. (2008).   15 
commodity  index  investments  have  been  available.  They  report  returns  which  compare 
favourably with those on equities although with slightly greater risk, and which dominate 
bonds  in  terms  of  the  Sharpe  ratio  –  see  Table  5.  Over  the  period  they  consider,  the 
commodity returns have a statistically insignificant (0.05) correlation with equities and a low 
but significant negative (-0.15) correlation with bond returns. These calculations suggest that 
investment in a long passive commodity fund could have bought diversification of an equities 




  Equities  Bonds  S&P GSCI 
Average return  5.6%  2.2%  5.2% 
Standard deviation  14.9%  8.5%  12.1% 
Sharpe ratio  0.38  0.26  0.43 
Annualized monthly returns, July 1957 – December 2004 
Source: Gorton and Rouwenhorst (2006) 
 
Despite these positive statistics, it seems possible that the investment community may 
be exaggerating the likely portfolio benefits from investment in commodities. The danger is 
that, as investors buy large long dated futures positions, they will pull up the prices of the 
long dates relative to those of the short dates and hence drive markets into contango. Such 
developments  will  depress  or  even  nullify  the  roll  returns  from  commodity  investments 
without reducing risk.
9  
Evidence for this may be seen by decomposing the excess return on the S&P GSCI 
into  its  spot  and  roll  return  component  as  in  Figure  3  which  charts  centred  25  month 
averages. Visually it seems apparent that while spot returns have been very favourable over 
the past decade, roll returns have been generally negative. The two sets of returns appear 
uncorrelated, so if the commodity boom draws to a close and roll returns remain negative, 
                                                 
9 “Index buying is based on a misconception. Commodity indexes are not a productive use of capital. 
When the idea was first promoted, there was a rationale for it. Commodity futures were selling at 
discounts  from  cash  and  institutions  could  pick  up  additional  returns  from  this  so-called 
‘backwardation’. Financial institutions were indirectly providing capital to producers who sold their 
products forward in order to finance production. That was a legitimate investment opportunity. But 
the field got crowded and that profit opportunity disappeared. Nevertheless, the asset class continues 
to attract additional investment just because it has turned out to be more profitable than other asset 
classes. It is a classic case of a misconception that is liable to be self-reinforcing in both directions.” 
(Soros, 2008, p.3).    16 
commodity futures investments will perform poorly.
10 If this view is correct, the risk-return 
characteristics that Gorton and Rouwenhorst (2006) and others have estimated for commodity 
investments over a historical period in which such investments were not easily available is 
likely  to  over-estimate  the  returns  realizable  in  the  current  environment  in  which  these 
investments have become straight-forward. Profitable investment in commodity futures will 
















Figure 3: S&P GSCI Spot and Roll Returns (25 month centred moving averages), 
January 1971 – December 2007 
 
6.  Speculation, volatility and extrapolative behaviour 
Finance theory distinguishes between informed and uninformed speculation (Bagehot, 1971; 
O’Hara, 1995, ch.3). According to this theory, informed speculation should have price effects 
as this is the way in which private information becomes impounded in publically-quoted 
prices. Uninformed speculation should either not have such effects, or in less liquid markets, 
                                                 
10 The statistics are suggestive rather than conclusive. Roll returns averaged -5.4% over the eight 
years 2000-07 as against 0.1% in the 10 years 1990-99. The t statistic on a difference in means test is 
- 2.05 which is just significant at the 5% level.   17 
should not have persistent effects. If uninformed trades do move a market price away from its 
fundamental value, informed traders, who know the fundamental value of the asset, will take 
advantage of the profitable trading opportunity with the result that the price will return to its 
fundamental value. The informed speculators stabilize in the manner set out by Friedman 
(1953). 
Despite this, economists and policy-makers both worry that trend-following can result 
in  herd  behaviour.  CTAs  operate  by  identifying  trends  and  positioning  themselves 
accordingly – see section 3. There is therefore a concern that a chance upward movement in a 
price may be taken as indicative of a positive trend resulting in further buying and hence 
driving the price further upwards, despite an absence of any fundamental justification. The 
result will be a speculative bubble. Negative bubbles are also possible. 
  There are two standard responses to this type of argument: 
·  First there is the Friedmanite argument that, in an efficient market, supply and demand 
fundamentals will rapidly re-assert themselves as informed fundamentals-based traders 
taking contrarian positions. However, De Long et al (1990) show that informed traders 
may  not  act  in  this  way  if  they  have  short  time  horizons  (perhaps  as  the  result  of 
performance  targets  or  reporting  requirements)  and  if  there  are  sufficiently  many 
uninformed trend-spotting speculators. If these conditions apply, the informed traders 
will bet on continuation of the trend even though they acknowledge it is contrary to 
fundamentals. The 1999-2000 internet equities bubble appears to fit this description. 
·  Trends  are  only  completely  clear  ex  post  and  this  leaves  considerable  scope  for 
disagreements between different CTAs as to whether or not a particular market does 
exhibit a trend at any moment in time. In aggregate, speculators will therefore generally 
not take a consistent position on one side of the market of the other. This argument may 
often be correct, but in those cases in which speculators are unanimous that a trend does 
exist, their behaviour may reinforce this trend.  
The existence and extent of trend-following behaviour may in principle be ascertained 
by regressing CTA-CPO positions on price changes over the previous days. These data are 
not, however, publically available and we therefore need to rely on studies undertaken by the 
regulatory agencies. Kodres (1994), Kodres and Prisker (1996), Irwin and Yoshimaru (1999) 
and  Irwin  and  Holt  (2004)  fall  into  this  category.  Using  the  CTC’s  confidential  sample 
already discussed in section 3, Irwin and Holt (2004) find that the net trading volume of large 
hedge funds and CTAs in six of the twelve futures markets they consider is significantly and   18 
positively related to price movements over the previous five days.
11 However, the degree of 
explanation is low. Irwin and Yoshimaru (1999) report very similar results for CTA-CPO 
positions.
12 In summary, the empirical evidence is consistent with the existence of trend-
following behaviour but also indicates that this generally be swamped by other influences. 
Can speculation of this type result in commodity price bubbles? A natural strategy is 
to regress price changes on the changes in the COT net non-commercial positions. However, 
the  results  of  such  regressions  are  difficult  to  interpret.  Firstly,  the  commercial/non-
commercial dichotomization no longer accords with contemporary market developments – 
see  section  2.  Secondly,  futures  positions  identically  sum  to  zero.  Since  aggregate  non-
reporting  positions  show  only  modest  variability,  there  is  necessarily  a  strong  negative 
correlation between net commercial and net non-commercial positions. This makes it difficult 
to distinguish between the effects of changes in commercial and non-commercial decisions. If 
current period positions are used as regressors, severe identification issues arise.
13   
  There is a clear and well-established (positive) link, observed across the entire range 
of financial markets, between trading volumes and price volatility so it should therefore not 
be surprising that an increase in non-commercial positions increases futures volatility – see 
Chang et al (1997), Bollerslev and Jubinski (1999) and Irwin and Holt (2004). Identification 
and collinearity issues also arise in this context but, because it seems likely that there will be 
only a modest feedback from price volatility to the positions themselves, endogeneity issues 
may be less acute. Irwin and Holt (2004), using their 1994 CFTC dataset, find significant 
positive coefficients linking the trading activity of large hedge funds and CTAs to futures 
volatility for nine of the thirteen markets they examine. (The coefficients are positive but 
statistically insignificant for the remaining four markets). 
  An  alternative,  indirect,  approach  is  to  attempt  to  estimate  the  profitability  of 
speculative positions. Reversing the Friedmanite argument, we might suppose that, to the 
extent that speculators have made profits, they must have had a stabilizing impact on prices – 
see Hartzmark (1987) and Leuthold et al. (1994). This inference is tendentious. Speculative 
                                                 
11 Copper, corn, cotton, gold, live hogs and natural gas. There is a significant negative relationship for 
Eurodollar futures. 
12 One can perform the same exercise for the entire non-commercial category, as in Dale and Zyren 
(1996), but interpretation is problematic as this category has become contaminated over recent years 
by the growth of index trading – see the discussion of the COT reports in section 2. 
13 Gilbert (2000) sets out a model in which speculators (non-commercials) have private information. 
Conditional on this information, the futures price is uninformative. Hedgers (commercials) attempt to 
infer  this  information  from  the  futures  price  but  are  unable  to  do  so  completely  because  of  the 
presence of noise traders (non-reporting traders). The consequence is that, following a positive signal, 
speculators bid positions away from hedgers.     19 
profits can be highly variable both across markets and over time, implying that we would 
need a large sample to justify any such inference. Irwin and Holt (2004) note this difficulty 
but also report a large ($400m) overall trading profit from the six month period they consider. 
What they do not emphasize is that this profit was due entirely to profits in just two markets, 
and that in one of these (coffee), these profits resulted almost entirely from a double frost 
episode in Brazil which  speculators could not possibly have anticipated – they were simply 
lucky to have been long at the right time.
14  
In general terms, the clear existence of bubbles in other asset markets, most notably 
equities and real estate, over the past decade makes it difficult to assert that efficient markets 
will always eliminate bubble behaviour. Moreover, commodity markets are characterized by 
very low short run elasticities of both production and consumption, despite the fact that long 
run supply elasticities are probably high. In a tight market in which only minimal stocks are 
held, the long run cost-related price becomes irrelevant and market equilibrium price ceases 
to be well-defined, not in the sense that the market does not clear, but in the sense that it will 
be very difficult to assess the price at which the market will clear on the basis of longer term 
fundamental factors. Fundamentals-based analysis may show where the price will finish but 
this will provide very little guide as to where it will go in the interim. This indeterminacy 
allows weight of the speculative money to determine the level of prices. 
It is simple to test for extrapolative behaviour. Consider a simple regression of today’s 
futures price ft on yesterday’s price 
  1 ln ln t t t f f - = a+b +e   (1) 
(i.e. an autoregression). If the (log) futures price follows a random walk process, we have 
b = 1, consistently with the futures price being an unbiased predictor of future spot prices – 
see  the  discussion  in  section  5.  Extrapolative  behaviour  will  imply  an  explosive 
autoregression with b > 1. It is sometimes held that explosive processes are implausible since 
otherwise prices would tend to zero or infinity, but this is not true if the coefficient b is only 
slightly  in  excess  of  unity,  implying  that  autoregression    is  mildly  explosive  and  if  the 





                                                 
14 This episode was discussed by Brunetti and Gilbert (1997) who made similar calculations.   20 
Table 6 
Tests for Explosive Behaviour: Non-Ferrous Metals February 2003 – August 2008 
    Spot  3 Months  15 Months  % Change in 3 Months 
Price 
May 2003 







(-0.116)  10.8% 
December 2003 








*  30.6% 
April 2004 







(-0.425)  - 21.9% 
May 2004 








**  7.9% 






(-0.298)  7.1% 







(-0.845)  5.2% 








*  15.1% 
September 
2004  
( n = 17) 








**  13.4% 
January 2006 








*  19.6% 
November 2007 








*  - 14.3% 








*  16.6% 








 *  14.0% 







(0.016)  10.6% 
February 2008 
( n = 19) 






*  13.7% 








*  - 26.2% 







(-0.112)  - 11.2%  May 2008 
( n = 18) 






*  - 9.8% 
June 2008 








*  5.6% 
The table reports the autoregressive coefficient b from regression of the log of the daily price on the 
previous day’s price over the calendar month in question for the six LME metals (aluminium, copper, lead, 
nickel, tin and zinc). The t statistic, in parentheses, tests the null hypothesis  0 : 1 H b =  against the explosive 
alternative 1 : 1 H b > . This statistic has the Dickey-Fuller distribution but unlike the standard case, we are 
interested in the right tail. Based on 100,000 bootstrap simulations, critical values for n = 17, 18, 19 and 20 
observations are 0.035, 0.032, 0.023 and 0.019 (95%) and 0.767, 0.760, 0.750 and 0.738 (99%). These 
simulations were performed under the null hypothesis that b = 1. A single asterisk indicates a statistic 
which rejects H0 at the 95% level and a double asterisk one which rejects also at the 99% level. Statistics 
are reported only for metals and months where at least one estimated coefficient b is significantly greater 
than unity. The percentage change in prices is the price on the final day of the month relative to that on the 
final day of the previous month. 
   21 
I estimated autoregressions of the form defined above using daily data for each of the 
six London Metal Exchange (LME) metals for each month from February 2003 to August 
2008. Table 6 lists the months for which coefficients were estimated as explosive.
15 There are 
ten  months  in  which  explosive  behaviour  is  detected.  Three  of  the  periods  estimated  as 
indicated as being subject to this type of behaviour, April 2004, November 2007 and May 
2008, saw falling prices indicating that extrapolative behaviour can be negative as well as 
positive. Nickel features in seven of the ten explosive months and zinc in five. There is some 
bunching: in September 2004, aluminium, copper, nickel and zinc are all seen as upwardly 
explosive and in February 2008, aluminium, nickel, tin and zinc were upwardly explosive, 
while in May 2008, nickel, tin and zinc were downwardly explosive.  
The proportion of ten out of the total of 67 months considered is 15%, more than is 
likely simply by chance on the random walk hypothesis. This may underestimate the number 
of periods of explosive behaviour since some periods will have straddled calendar months. 
Furthermore, it is not to be expected that explosive behaviour will be evident in all periods. 
These results therefore do suggest that extrapolative behaviour has been a feature of non-
ferrous metals over recent years.
16  
Episodes characterized by explosive behaviour may have been short-lived.  There is 
no implication that prices necessarily over-reacted, that bubbles persisted or that speculation 
was  responsible  for  a  significant  proportion  of  the  most  recent  commodity  price  boom. 
Several commentators have noted that a number of commodities whose prices rose most over 
the recent boom either do not have futures markets (coal in the energy group, molybdenum in 
non-ferrous  metals)  or  have  relatively  illiquid  futures  markets  (steel  in  metals,  rice  in 
agriculturals). It is clear that futures speculation could not have played a role in the price rises 
experienced by these commodities. Nevertheless, the discussion in this section shows that the 
efficient  markets  view  that  uninformed  speculation  has  no  effect  on  market  prices  and 
volatility should be rejected. The more difficult issue is to identify those periods in which 
speculation has taken prices away from fundamental values and to establish the persistence of 
such departures. 
 
                                                 
15 Explosive behaviour is easily detected and this is reflected in the low Dickey-Fuller critical values – 
see Fuller (1976) and the notes to Table 6. These low critical values arise because the estimated b is 
downward biased and hence, on the null hypothesis, there is a very low probability of observing an 
estimate in excess of unity. This approach draws on Phillips (2006). See also Phillips and Magdalinos 
(2007). I am grateful to Isabel Figuerola-Ferretti and Rod McCrorie for discussion of these issues. 
16 In Gilbert (2008) I report similar results for the Chicago Board of Trade corn, soybeans and wheat 
contracts.   22 
7.  Effects of index-based investment 
There has been less research on the effects of index-based investment in part because it is still 
a  relatively  new  phenomenon,  in  part  because  the  distinction  between  investment  and 
speculations is not yet standard but, most importantly, because of lack of publically available 
data which allows index-based investment to be distinguished from speculation. 
  In this section, I report results of Granger non-causality tests which makes use of the 
CFTC’s supplementary COT reports, discussed above in section 2, and which allow one to 
distinguish between positions held by index providers and those of other non-commercial 
traders. Here, I consider the effects of these positions in the four Chicago Board of Trade 
agricultural  markets  covered  in  the  COT  supplementary  reports  –  corn  (maize),  soybean 
soybean oil and wheat. The tests are conducted within a third order Vector AutoRegression 





t j t j j t j j t j t
j j j
r r x z - - -
= = =
= a + a + b + g +e ∑ ∑ ∑   (2) 
where rt is the week-on-week change in the price of the nearby contract on the Chicago 
Board of Trade,
17 xt is the weekly  change in futures positions of index providers and zt is the 
weekly  change in futures positions of other non-commercial traders.  
  The VAR framework defined by equation (2) allows us to test two sets of hypotheses.  
The first two hypotheses is changes in the index and non-commercial positions respectively 
do not affect returns 
1 2
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 : 0 : 0 H H b =b =b = g = g = g =  
These correspond to standard Granger non-causality tests – see Stock and Watson (2003, chs. 
13 and 14). Conditional on rejection of either of these null hypotheses, we may examine 
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g = ∑  
relates to persistence of the effects of changes in non-commercial positions.  (In each case, 
the alternative hypothesis is the negation of the null). Table 7 reports the test results.
18 
 
                                                 
17 I follow the convention of rolling on the first day of the delivery month. Price changes are always 
measured in relation to the same contract (i.e. in a roll week the price change is relative to what was 
previously the second position). 
18 The coefficient estimates are uninteresting and are omitted.   23 
Table 7 
Granger Non-Causality Tests for CBOT Agricultural Futures 
Index and Other Non-Commercial Positions 
    Corn  Soybeans  Soybean Oil  Wheat 
1

















  j b ∑   - 0.413  5.374  - 2.652  0.769 
3








  j g ∑   - 0.078  0.932  - 0.169  - 1.019 
4









2  0.053  0.096  0.068  0.039 
The table reports the test outcomes for the five tests outlined in the text. Tail probabilities are 
given parenthetically. 
Sample: 31 January 2007, weekly, to 26 August 2008. Estimation by OLS. 
 
The first row of the table gives the Granger non-causality tests for the index positions. 
Rejection  of  the  null  hypothesis 
1
0 H ,  indicated  at  the  conventional  95%  level  by  a  tail 
probability of less than 5%, implies that changes in index  positions cause  (in the sense of 
Granger-cause) futures price returns over the following weeks. A rejection is obtained for 
soybeans but nor for the other three commodities. The second row reports the same test for 
the changes in net non-commercial positions. Here the null hypothesis 
2
0 H  is not rejected in 
any of the four cases considered. Since we have rejected 
1
0 H  for the case of soybeans, we 
may look at the persistence of this effect. The estimated VAR shows that the sum of these 
coefficients  is  positive,  and  the  test  of 
3
0 H   establishes  the  statistical  significance  of  this 
impact. The data therefore indicate that changes in index positions had a persistent positive 
impact on soybean prices over the sample considered. However, there is no evidence for 
similar effects in the other three commodities examined. 
Failure to reject the null hypothesis of no effect should not be taken as implying that 
neither  changes  in  index  positions  nor  those  in  non-commercial  positions  affect  futures 
returns. According to the Efficient Markets Hypothesis, we should expect the price effects of 
position changes to be contemporaneous. This implies that Granger non-causality tests of the 
type reported here probably lack power. Increased power might be obtained by looking at the 
contemporaneous  correlations.  The  correlations  between  returns  and  changes  in  index 
positions range from 0.06 for wheat to 0.38 for soybeans. The correlations between returns   24 
and changes in non-commercial positions are higher: 0.40 for wheat to 0.57 for soybeans. 
However, interpretation of these correlations is problematic since causation might also run 
from returns to position changes.  
Overall,  therefore,  there  is  weak  evidence  that  index  investment  may  have  been 
partially responsible for raising at least some commodity prices during the recent boom. 
 
8.  Conclusions  
The  traditional  futures  market  distinction  between  hedgers  and  speculators  no  longer 
corresponds  closely  with  the  differences  in  types  of  actors  in  commodity  markets.  In 
particular,  the  traditional  distinction  fails  to  acknowledge  the  emergence  of  index-based 
investment which now accounts for 20%-50% of total open interest in many important U.S. 
commodity markets. This has been acknowledged by the U.S. commodities futures regulator, 
the CFTC, which has gone some way to providing additional information, although currently 
only for agricultural markets.  
Traditional speculators are often trend followers, moving from one market to another 
as the opportunities arise. They may either be long or short, but typically they hold positions 
for only short periods of time. Index-based investors aim to track the returns one of other of 
two major commodity futures indices, or sub-indices of these indices. Funds are therefore 
allocated  in  largely  predetermined  proportions  across  the  different  commodity  markets 
reflecting  index  composition.  These  indices  only  give  positive  weights  and  hence  index 
investors are always long. Investors are motivated to improve the risk-return characteristics 
of  their  overall  portfolios,  in  which  commodities  will  typically  form  a  small  component, 
rather  than  in  the  risk-return  properties  of  the  commodity  sub-portfolio  or  its  individual 
commodity components. They tend to hold for long periods implying that the index-provider 
will  need  to  roll  offsetting  futures  positions  as  they  approach  expiration.  By  contrast, 
speculators will seldom roll positions. 
The  returns  to  commodity  futures  investment  differ  from  those  obtained  from 
investing in the physical commodity. In addition to the spot returns, the investor also earns a 
roll  return  when  the  position  is  rolled  (positive  if  the  commodity  is  in  backwardation, 
negative if in contango), the risk free rate of interest on the collateral posted against the 
position  and  also  a  recomposition  return  if  the  index  is  reweighted.  Spot  returns  have 
generally been positive over the most recent decade as the consequence of the commodity 
boom but roll returns have tended to decline and become negative. It seems possible that, 
despite overall high prices, growing investment in commodity futures has pushed markets   25 
into contango. If this conjecture turn out to be correct, commodity investors are likely to be 
disappointed by future returns. 
Finance theory indicates that, although informed speculation should have an impact 
on  prices,  since  this  is  the  way  in  which  information  becomes  impounded  in  prices, 
uninformed speculation should not have any price effect. If uninformed speculation takes the 
market price away from its fundamentally-determined level, contrarian fundamental-based 
traders should take advantage of the resulting profit opportunities thereby retuning the price 
to its fair value. This may happen, but the other possibility is that a chance movement in price 
may attract trend-following speculators who exacerbate the departure of the price from its 
fundamental value. This will lead to prices exploding upwards or downwards, albeit generally 
only for short periods of time. I show evidence that non-ferrous metals markets have been 
characterized by so-called weakly explosive behaviour of this sort consistent with the view 
that uninformed speculation can be destabilizing. These episodes appear too frequent to be 
the result of chance.  I  conclude that commodity  prices have not always reflected market 
fundamentals, and that there may have been elements of speculative froth. 
The same argument implies that index-based investment should not have any effect, 
or  more  weakly  any  persistent  effect,  on  commodity  futures  prices.  I  have  tested  this 
hypothesis using data on the four agricultural commodities treaded on the Chicago Board of 
Trade for which the CFTC provides position data on the positions of index providers. In the 
case of soybeans, there does appear to be evidence that changes in index positions have had a 
positive  and  persistent  effect  on  futures  returns.  Data  for  the  other  three  commodities 
examined fail to support this hypothesis. Overall, there is weak evidence for the contention 
that index investment contributed to the recent commodity price boom. 
None of this implies that either speculation or commodity investment have been a 
major factor in the commodity boom of the first decade of the century. On the other hand, it 
is  too  simple  to  rule  out  the  possibility  that  these  activities  may  have  affected  prices  in 
particular markets at particular periods of time. It is indeed possible that some of these effects 
have  been  substantial  and  some  persistent.  These  observations  will  probably  not  surprise 
market  participants.  The  urgent  agenda  is  to  incorporate  them  into  the  models  which 
economists use to discuss the operation of these markets. 
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